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“RACE IS NOT A DETERMINATIVE 
FACTOR”1: MIXED RACE CHILDREN AND 
CUSTODY CASES IN CANADA* 
 
Susan B. Boyd and Krisha Dhaliwal** 
 
Statistics suggest that an increase will occur in the number of custody 
disputes involving mixed race children in Canada. This article 
considers the extent to which the fact that a child is mixed race factors 
into child custody determinations, and how courts consider it. It also 
discusses whether considering a child’s mixed race heritage is 
helpful in the child-custody context. The article first explains the use 
of “race” and “culture” in the Canadian context, then reviews the 
literature on mixed race children and the law, before examining 
legislation on the “best interests of the child.”  The focus of the paper 
is an analysis of reported Canadian custody cases in which a child’s 
mixed race heritage was mentioned in the written judgment, both 
before and after the leading case, Van de Perre v. Edwards. The case-
law analysis considers questions such as judicial racism, “race-
matching,” and how race and culture are weighed against other 
factors relevant to a child’s best interests. The conclusion offers 
suggestions for how courts should deal with custody disputes over 
mixed race children, based on trends identified in the case law. While 
racialized parents are not inevitably best suited for primary custody 
of mixed race children, it is key for any parent seeking custody to 
                                                 
 
1 Van de Perre v Edwards, 2001 SCC 60 at para 39, [2001] 2 SCR 1014 [Van 
de Perre]. 
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demonstrate their ability to foster the healthy development of a 
child’s multifaceted identity. More directive legislative language 
might be useful in order to ensure that at least some judicial attention 
is paid to race and culture. Finally, taking judicial notice of the 
relevance of race would also be helpful in acknowledging the 
persistent existence of racism in Canadian society, as would a more 




The number of mixed race couples is on the rise in Canada; they 
constitute 4.6 per cent of all married and common-law couples, up from 
2.6 per cent in 1991 and 3.1 per cent in 2001.2 Although not all couples 
conceive children and not all children are raised in couples, these 
statistics suggest that the legal system is likely to see more custody 
                                                 
 
2 See e.g. Statistics Canada, “A Portrait of Couples in Mixed Unions”, by Anne 
Milan, Hélène Maheux & Tina Chui, in Canadian Social Trends, Catalogue 
No 11-008-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 20 April 2010) 70-80; Statistics 
Canada, “Mixed Unions in Canada”, in National Household Survey, 
Catalogue 99-010-X2011003 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2011) at 4. Roughly 
half of these couples are made up of one Canadian-born person and one 
foreign-born person, with Japanese, Latin American, and Black people being 
the most likely to be in mixed raced unions, and with South Asian and Chinese 
people (the two largest minorities in Canada) being the least likely to marry 
outside their groups. See Statistics Canada, “Mixed Unions in Canada”, ibid 
at 4-5. The majority of mixed race unions are between one visible minority 
person, and one non-visible minority person. See ibid at 4. Also, the vast 
majority of mixed race couples live in major metropolitan areas. See ibid at 7. 
Finally, Milan, Maheux & Chui, supra note 2, have pointed out that as a 
whole, racialized men and women are equally likely to be in mixed race 
unions. However, there are differences within certain subgroups. For instance, 
men from Arab, West Asian, Black, and South Asian backgrounds are more 
likely than women from these backgrounds to partner with people outside of 
their group. Similarly, women from Filipino, Korean, Southeast Asian, 
Japanese, Chinese, and Latin American backgrounds are more likely than men 
from these backgrounds to be in mixed race unions. See ibid at 17.  





disputes involving mixed race children in the future. Some such 
disputes have, of course, already come before the courts. In such cases, 
it is sometimes argued that a visible minority parent may be better able 
to deal with the child’s experiences of racism or that race should at 
least be a factor that must be considered in determining the best 
interests of a child. 
 
This article examines the extent to which the fact that a child 
is mixed race makes a difference, or should make a difference, in the 
determination of legal disputes about parental rights and 
responsibilities or custody,3 and, if so, how. In order to better 
understand the issues that arise in such cases, we reviewed literature 
on mixed race children and law, as well as legislation on the best 
interests of the child. The heart of our study, however, is an analysis of 
reported Canadian custody cases where a child’s mixed race heritage 
was mentioned in the written judgment. In our search for both cases 
and for literature, we included mixed race children with Aboriginal 
heritage. Some of the cases discussed in this paper do not deal with 
race directly, but rather with related, but distinct, issues of culture, 
which include religion and language.  
 
Custody decisions are notoriously difficult and judges struggle 
to balance the different factors that may be in play in any given case. 
One question we considered is whether a focus on factors such as 
stability or a history of care may diminish attention that ought to be 
devoted to the significance of race, culture, or racism in the child’s life. 
Although our conclusion suggests that greater account of race in a 
                                                 
 
3 Many jurisdictions have now abandoned the terminology of “custody” and 
“access” in favour of concepts such as parenting time and parental 
responsibilities (e.g. Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25). We use “custody” as 
a generic term in this article, and we use it to refer to disputes between 
individuals (usually parents), not between individuals and the state (child 
protection). The Canadian Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 still uses the language 
of custody and access, as do several provincial statutes. 
 





child’s life should be taken in many cases, it should be noted that this 
field of law also has a history of failing to take account of other 
important factors, such as gendered inequalities like women’s 
generally greater responsibility for care of children.4 Another problem 
is that any judicial emphasis on financial or household stability in a 
child’s life can disadvantage a parent who faces economic challenges 
but who may nevertheless be a good parent. As Charmaine Williams 
has argued, any analysis of cases involving mixed race children must 
use an analytical framework that understands the ways in which race, 
class, and gender interact and generate complex patterns of advantage 
and jeopardy.5 Although the best interests of the child are manifestly 
the paramount consideration in any custody case, determination of the 
outcome is not insulated from the filters of race, class, and gender, even 
if these factors are not explicitly discussed in the judgment.6 
 
This article proceeds as follows. We first review our approach 
to race, culture, and ethnicity and offer a brief analysis of how race and 
racism are treated in Canada. We then briefly review relevant 
legislation in Canada and internationally. Next, our case law review 
begins with a discussion of the leading case in Canada, Van de Perre 
v. Edwards.7 Our detailed case-law study attempts to isolate various 
issues that we anticipated might arise in cases involving mixed race 
children. In particular, we are concerned with how race and culture are 
weighed against other factors relevant to a child’s best interests. We 
                                                 
 
4 Susan B Boyd, Child Custody, Law, and Women’s Work (Don Mills: Oxford 
University Press, 2003) [Boyd, Child Custody]; Carol Smart & Selma 
Sevenhuijsen, eds, Child Custody and the Politics of Gender (London: 
Routledge, 1989).  
5 Charmaine C Williams, “Race (and Gender and Class) and Child Custody: 
Theorizing Intersections in Two Canadian Court Cases” (2004) 16:2 NWSA 
Journal 46. 
6 Andrea Doucet, “Parental Responsibilities: Dilemmas of Measurement and 
Gender Equality” (2015) 77:1 J of Marriage and Family 224. 
7 Van de Perre, supra note 1.  





also ask whether judicial racism can be detected on the face of the 
judgments and whether an essentialist “race-matching” approach is 
used. In our conclusion, we suggest that judicial notice should be taken 
of race and racism, and that race and racism should always be at least 
considered when custody of a mixed race child is at issue. That said, 
other factors remain key to determining a child’s best interests and we 
do not suggest that a racialized parent is inevitably better suited to 
assume primary care or custody of a child. 
 
APPROACHES TO RACE, CULTURE, AND ETHNICITY 
 
Even though judges often use race and culture interchangeably,8 for the 
purposes of this article, we adopt Emily Carasco’s definition of race, 
which she suggests is conceptually distinct from culture and ethnicity.9 
Whereas culture and ethnicity are based on factors such as kinship and 
a common sense of belonging, and are more complex, ongoing, and 
learned, race is based on more immutable external biological factors 
such as skin colour, the shape of facial features, and other physical 
characteristics.10 Despite the fact that racial categorization is widely 
acknowledged to be arbitrary and unscientific, it has persisted into the 
present day, along with the attendant social phenomenon of racism.11 
As Minelle Mahtani reminds us, there is an “arbitrary connection 
between anatomical features and political meaning, where certain 
physical differences (like skin colour and hair type) have been used to 
                                                 
 
8 See Tammy Wing-Yun Law, “The Race Issue in Custody Law: Is Van de 
Perre Right?” (2003) 21 Can Fam LQ 153 at 154. 
9 Emily F Carasco, “Race and Child Custody in Canada: Its Relevance and 
Role” (1999) 16 Can J Fam L 11 at 11, 24. 
10 For more commentary on this understanding of race in the context of Canadian 
child custody law, see Law, supra note 8 at 153-54; Annie Bunting, 
“Complicating Culture in Child Placement Decisions” (2004) 16 CJWL 137 
at 14149.  
11 Carasco, supra note 9 at 2425.  





indicate crucial power differentials between individuals.”12 That is, 
race is a social construction rather than a biological fact, but that insight 
does not mean that race, or perhaps more aptly racism, has no 
consequences in the real world.13 Specifically in our context, a child’s 
racial identity or perceived race can play a significant role in her 
development.14 
 
Canadian scholars have revealed that racial hierarchies have 
been created and reinforced through various policies and laws.15 In 
western liberal democracies such as Canada, “whiteness” has long 
operated as a guiding feature of racial categorization. Who counts as 
                                                 
 
12 Minelle Mahtani, Mixed Race Amnesia: Resisting the Romanticization of 
Multiraciality (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014) at 23. 
13 Ibid at 24. 
14 See Law’s review of social science research, supra note 8 at 160ff. See also 
Roland G Fryer Jr et al, “The Plight of Mixed Race Adolescents” (2012) 94:3 
Rev of Economics and Statistics 621; Christopher S Ruebeck, Susan L Averett 
& Howard Bodenhorn, “Acting White or Acting Black: Mixed-Race 
Adolescents’ Identity and Behavior” (2009) 9:1 BE J Economic Analysis & 
Policy 1; David R Harris & Jeremiah Joseph Sim, “Who Is Multiracial? 
Assessing the Complexity of Lived Race” (2002) 67 American Sociological 
Rev 614; Grace Kao, “Racial Identity and Academic Performance: An 
Examination of Biracial Asian and African American Youth” (1999) 2:3 J 
Asian American Studies 223. 
15 See e.g. Constance C Backhouse, Colour-Coded: A Legal History of Racism 
in Canada, 1900-1950 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999). As Law, 
supra note 8, and others point out, Canada does in fact have its own racist 
history. For instance, our immigration policy has a notably dark past, 
including the Chinese “head tax” imposed by the Chinese Immigration Act, 
RSC 1885, c 71, as well as Canada’s general historical preference for north 
European immigrants. See generally Leo Driedger & Shiva S Halli, eds, Race 
and Racism: Canada’s Challenge (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2000) at 7. 





white16 has changed over time,17 but whiteness as a concept has always 
“denote[d] the racial chasm that separated [white] groups from 
‘Aboriginal peoples,’ the ‘Chinese,’ and ‘Blacks.’”18 Whiteness, 
though its definition is mutable, is taken for granted as an unspoken 
norm. That is, whiteness need not be static in order for other racial  
 
 
                                                 
 
16 To make a brief note on nomenclature, this paper will capitalize all terms used 
to denote racial categories, apart from the term “white.” This follows the 
practice of many critical race scholars, such as Erica Chung-Yue Tao, who 
explained the practice as follows, in “Re-defining Race Relations—Beyond 
the Threat of ‘Loving Blackness’” (1993) 6:2 CJWL 455 at 457: “Language 
and conventions in writing are integral to internalized colonization. The 
capitalization of Black and Blackness becomes a disruption in reading, 
because it breaches the standard way of communicating in textual format. In 
this way, capitalization of Black represents a perverse usage of the colonizer’s 
language, and is, therefore, a visual and linguistic subversion of white 
supremacy. At the same time, capitalizing Black also affirms pride and power 
in group identity. For example, we say we are Canadians, not canadians. 
Finally, the word ‘white’ will not be capitalized on the grounds that white and 
whiteness are the reference points by which all other colours or racially 
defined groups are measured, named, described, and understood. To capitalize 
white would be, in effect, to say the obvious and affirm the norm.” See also 
Backhouse, supra note 15 at 8. We will also use the term “racialized” (as 
opposed to terms such as “person of colour”) to acknowledge that racial 
categorization results from a social process and is not biologically inherent. 
Finally, we will use the terms “minority” and “visible minority,” as these are 
terms that have historically been used in Canadian legislation.  
17 See Backhouse, supra note 15 at 9: “Some will argue that the individuals I 
have designated as ‘white’ probably did not understand themselves as ‘white,’ 
and preferred to think of themselves as having a particular country of origin. . 
. .  It is true that the racial identity of the dominant white group was splintered 
in many directions (not unlike the racial identity of other groups), and that 
multiple subgroups formed distinct rankings (which would themselves shift 
over time).” 
18 Ibid. 





identities to be measured in contrast to that norm and “othered” as a 
result.19 
 
The genesis of Canada as a “white” country is tied to our 
colonial history. Whites began to outnumber the Aboriginal population 
in the late 1700s and early 1800s, with non-Aboriginals outnumbering 
Aboriginals by an estimation of ten to one by 1812.20 Nevertheless, 
many Canadians view Canada as being relatively untroubled by racism 
and as having a benign history of race relations, especially when 
compared to the United States.21 Alongside some of the more overtly 
racist practices, for instance against Chinese immigrants,22 a “melting 
pot” approach was common in the early twentieth century, suggesting 
that the Canadian nation was homogenous and that immigrant and 
ethnic populations should blend into dominant Canadian culture.23 Yet 
                                                 
 
19 See generally Sherene H Razack, Looking White People in the Eye: Gender, 
Race, and Culture in Courtrooms and Classrooms (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1998) [Razack, Looking]; Sherene Razack, Space, Race, and 
the Law: Unmapping a White Settler Society (Toronto: Between the Lines, 
2002); Leo Driedger & Angus Reid, “Public Opinion on Visible Minorities” 
in Driedger & Halli, supra note 15, 152 at 15859; Peggy McIntosh, “White 
Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to See 
Correspondences Through Work in Women’s Studies” Working Paper No 
189, Wellesley College, Centre for Research on Women; Richard Dyer, “The 
Matter of Whiteness” in Paula S Rothenberg, ed, White Privilege: Essential 
Readings on the Other Side of Racism (New York: Worth, 2002) 89.   
20 Canada, Royal Commission, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples: Looking Forward, Looking Back, vol 1 (Ottawa: Supply and 
Services Canada, 1996) at 1.6.  
21 See e.g. Razack, Looking, supra note 19 at 1617; Williams, supra note 5 at 
46.  
22 See comments in supra note 15. 
23 For a discussion on theories of racial integration, including “melting pot” 
theories of assimilation and homogenization, see Leo Driedger & Shiva S 





despite the practice since the 1970s24 of affirming the multicultural 
nature of Canada,25 the extent to which racial and cultural difference 
should be recognized or encouraged remains controversial.26 So too do 
                                                 
 
Halli, “Racial Integration: Theoretical Options” [Driedger & Halli, “Racial 
Integration”] in Driedger & Halli, supra note 15, 55 at 5576.  
24 See Canadian Multiculturalism Act, RSC 1985, c 24; Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B 
to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 27 (“This Charter shall be 
interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of 
the multicultural heritage of Canadians”). 
25 For a critical summary and assessment of Canada’s use of multiculturalism, 
see Mahtani, supra note 12 at 98111. For recent affirmations of 
multiculturalism from the Canadian government, see e.g. Canada, Citizenship 
and Immigration Canada, “Annual Report on the Operation of the Canadian 
Multiculturalism Act 20122013” (Ottawa: CIC, 3 February 2014), online: 
<www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/ publications/multi-report2013/3.asp>; 
Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Canadian Multiculturalism: 
An Inclusive Citizenship” (Ottawa: CIC, 19 October 2012), online: 
<www.cic. gc.ca/english/multiculturalism/citizenship.asp>; Canada, 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Multiculturalism” Ottawa: CIC, 7 May 
2014), online: <hwww.cic.gc.ca/ENGLISH/multiculturalism/index.asp?>.  
26 See e.g. the controversy surrounding the proposed “Charter of Quebec 
Values” (Bill 60, Charter affirming the values of State secularism and 
religious neutrality and of equality between women and men, and providing a 
framework for accommodation requests, 1st Sess, 40th Leg, Quebec, 2013). 
Bill 60 died on the order paper when the Parti Quebecois lost the 2014 Quebec 
provincial election to the Quebec Liberal Party. Though many self-proclaimed 
secular and feminist Quebeckers supported the proposed Charter, it was also 
heavily criticized for being ethnocentric and xenophobic, as it would have 
prevented public sector employees from wearing “conspicuous” religious 
symbols or articles of clothing (such as turbans, hijabs, nijabs, or kippahs), 
which would largely have been worn by racial, cultural, and religious 
minorities. For more discussion on the proposed Charter and its connection to 
racial and cultural assimilation, see e.g. Supriya Dwivedi, “Quebec Can Be 
Perfectly Secular without an Offensive Charter” The Globe and Mail (10 
September 2013), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-





the questions of whether racism exists and how to deal with it.27 
 
Multicultural policy has been criticized for its inadequacy in 
achieving antiracist objectives and, indeed, its failure to define “race” 
or to address racism as a “social relationship of dominance and 
subordination, created by and engendering structural inequality.”28 
Sherene Razack suggests that the policy of multiculturalism in Canada 
has aided a transition away from the discourse of race and racism to 
one of culture and language. This “culturalization of racism” attributes 
Black “inferiority,” for instance, to factors such as cultural deficiency, 
social inadequacy, and technological underdevelopment rather than 
structural forces such as racism.29 Vrinda Narain has similarly 
suggested that the focus on cultural difference has diminished attention 
to structural inequalities such as poverty, unemployment, and racism.30 
When judges deal with disputes over children, the tendency to focus 
on the individual at the expense of larger structural issues is 
                                                 
 
debate/quebec-can-be-perfectly-secular-without-an-offensive-
charter/article14214333>; Emmett MacFarlane, “Quebec’s Secular Charter is 
Clearly Unconstitutional, but Could Still Become Law” The Globe and Mail 
(11 September 2013), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-
debate/quebecs-secular-charter-is-clearly-unconstitutional-it-could-still-
become-law/article14241046>. For a critique of Canadian multiculturalism in 
practice that predates the Quebec Charter controversy, see Neil Bissoondath, 
Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada (Toronto: Penguin 
Random House Canada, 2002). 
27 See generally Rakhi Ruparelia, “Legal Feminism and the Post-Racism 
Fantasy” (2014) 26:1 CJWL 81.  
28 Audrey Kobayashi, “Multiculturalism: Representing a Canadian Institution” 
in JS Duncan & D Ley, eds, Place/Culture/Representation (London: 
Routledge, 1993) 205 at 22122. 
29 Razack, Looking, supra note 19 at 60. 
30 See generally Vrinda Narain, “Taking ‘Culture’ out of Multiculturalism” 
(2014) 26:1 CJWL 116. 





exacerbated due to the need to make a decision in relation to the 
individuals at issue.31 
 
Given these complex and controversial questions, and given 
the tendency of Canadians to cherish the notion that Canada is a 
particularly tolerant nation, it is not uncommon for us to maintain 
silence around issues concerning race and racism or even to deny that 
racism exists.32 It would not be surprising to find that some judges (who 
are still predominantly white in Canada33) share this approach and that 
some may adhere to the (optimistic) notion that Canada is relatively 
free of racism or is “race blind.” They may be challenged by the 
suggestion that they should take race and the possibility of racism 
seriously in their judicial decision making and may genuinely feel they 
do not know how to do so. They may fall prey to ethnocentrism and 
unconscious cultural biases.34 We return to this issue when discussing 
judicial education in the conclusion. 
                                                 
 
31 See Marlee Kline, “Complicating the Ideology of Motherhood: Child Welfare 
Law and First Nation Women” (1993) 18 Queen’s LJ 306. 
32 Razack, Looking, supra note 19 at 6061 
33 It is difficult to find statistics on judicial diversity: see Sonia Lawrence, 
“Reflections: On Judicial Diversity and Judicial Independence” in Adam 
Dodek & Lorne Sossin, eds, Judicial Independence in Context (Toronto: Irwin 
Law, 2010) 193. But see also Kirk Makin, “Of 100 new federally appointed 
judges, 98 are white, Globe finds” The Globe and Mail (17 April 2012), 
online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/of-100-new-
federally-appointed-judges-98-are-white-globe-finds/article4101504>. 
Although the percentage of women judges remains lower than it should be, 
the paucity of racialized judges is particularly striking, and judicial 
appointments are clearly failing to keep pace with the number of racialized 
lawyers in the profession, as well as the number of racialized Canadians. See 
Rosemary Cairns Way, “Deliberate Disregard: Judicial Appointments under 
the Harper Government” (2014) 67 SCLR (2d Series) 43. 
34 See Amber Chew, “Judicial Consideration of Culture in Child-Related 
Proceedings under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)” (2007) 21:2 Austl J Fam 
L 173 at Part V. 





The uncertainty about how to deal with racism in law is 
illustrated by the controversy that emerged in R. v. R.D.S.,35 a case on 
reasonable apprehension of bias that began with the criminal trial of a 
black youth. Judge Corinne Sparks, the first African Nova Scotian to 
be appointed to the judiciary and the first African Canadian female to 
serve on the bench,36 rendered the trial decision. In her acquittal of the 
youth, who was facing criminal charges for allegedly assaulting a 
police officer, Judge Sparks suggested racism on the part of the white 
police officer, and commented on how the police officer’s treatment of 
the youth was “in keeping with the prevalent attitude of the 
day.”37Although the lower Courts agreed that there could be a 
reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of Judge Sparks, the 
Supreme Court of Canada restored her decision to acquit the youth, and 
noted that “[a] judge who happens to be black is no more likely to be 
biased in dealing with black litigants, than a white judge is likely to be 
biased in favour of white litigants.”38 The media coverage of this case, 
as with the Van de Perre v. Edwards case discussed below, broke the 
silence and signalled that uncomfortable conversations about the role 
of race and racism had arisen.39 
                                                 
 
35 [1997] 3 SCR 484, 151 DLR (4th) 193 [RDS cited to SCR]. 
36 Sharon Melson Fletcher, “Corinne Sparks Biography” Brief Biographies, 
online: <http://biography.jrank.org/pages/2828/Sparks-Corinne.html>. 
37 RDS, supra note 35 at para 4. 
38 Ibid at para 115. For more on this controversy, see Richard Devlin & Dianne 
Pothier, “Redressing the Imbalances: Rethinking the Judicial Role after R. v. 
R.D.S.” (1999-2000) 31 Ottawa L Rev 1; Allan C Hutchinson & Kathleen 
Strachan, “Forum on R. v. R.D.S.: What’s the Difference? Interpretation, 
Identity and R. v. R.D.S.” (1998) 21 Dal LJ 219; April Burey, “Forum on R. 
v. R.D.S.: No Dichotomies: Reflections on Equality for African Canadians in 
R. v. R.D.S.” (1998) 21 Dal LJ 199.  
39 See e.g. Jim Bronskill, “High Court Sets Rules on Judicial Bias: Black Judge’s 
Comments Inappropriate but Did Not Cross the Line” The Ottawa Citizen (27 
September 1997) A3; Joey Thompson, “Teen’s Acquittal Prompts Legal 
Ruling on Racism” The Province (10 October 1997) A16; David Vienneau, 





Informed by the notions that race, as it is constructed in 
Western societies, remains a key marker and that it intersects with other 
factors such as gender and class,40 we try to take a non-essentialist 
approach to race in this article. We agree with Carasco that race is 
deeply relevant to the development of children’s identity and to their 
future in society, and we also note that Carasco would not make race a 
singularly determinative factor in a best-interests test.41 An essentialist 
approach to race would hold that racial categorization based on skin 
colour and other aspects of physical appearance indicates other 
characteristics, such as intelligence, inclinations, and talents.42 A non-
essentialist approach, on the other hand, understands that racial 
categorization based on physical appearance does not entail any other 
characteristics, and understands race to have “meaning only as a 
socially constructed category” that divides people artificially.43 In the 
custody context, an essentialist approach might assume that certain 
negative qualities are associated with particular races and dictate 
against placement of a child with a parent from that race. Or, an 
essentialist approach might assume, rather simplistically, that a race-
matching approach is most appropriate. That is, placing a racialized 
child with the parent who has similar skin colour and other physical 
attributes to the child might be best, since these matching physical 
attributes could indicate other similar qualities, and thus greater 
parental suitability. This approach also potentially perpetuates racist 
stereotyping.44 As we shall see, some judges have adopted an overly 
                                                 
 
“Judge Cleared Over Race Remarks: Top Court Deals with Bias Charge” 
Toronto Star (27 September 1997) A3. See also Williams, supra note 5. 
40 Kline, supra note 31; Williams, supra note 5; Bunting, supra note 10. 
41 Carasco, supra note 9. 
42 Anna Stubblefield, “Racial Identity and Non-Essentialism about Race” (1995) 
21:3 Social Theory & Practice 341 at 341. 
43 Ibid.  
44 Bunting, supra note 10 at 142; Christine Davies, QC, “Racial and Cultural 
Issues in Custody Matters” (1993) 10 Can Fam LQ 1 at 3031; Ya’ir Ronen, 





simplistic and potentially prejudicial race-matching approach. 
 
Before reviewing the jurisprudence on custody and mixed race 
children, however, we offer an analysis of how legislation on the best 
interests of the child in Canada and selected other jurisdictions deals 




Our search for legislation in Canada and other countries with similar 
legal systems that addresses race, ethnicity, or culture in the custody 
context revealed that there is quite a disparity in approach. By no 
means does all such legislation refer to these factors, and “race” and 
Aboriginality per se are rarely mentioned.  
 
All Canadian legislation on child custody other than that in 
Quebec makes it clear that the best interests of the child are the sole or 
paramount consideration rather than, say, parental interests.45 For 
instance, British Columbia’s new Family Law Act states that “[i]n 
making an agreement or order . . . respecting guardianship, parenting 
arrangements or contact with a child, the parties and the court must 
consider the best interests of the child only.”46 Some statutes, including 
British Columbia’s, list numerous factors that are to be considered 
when determining what is in a child’s best interests, including the very 
typical language of “all of the child’s needs and circumstances.”47 
These factors include, inter alia, the child’s health and emotional well-
being, the child’s views, the nature and strength of the relationship 
                                                 
 
“Redefining the Child’s Right to Identity” (2004) 18:2 Intl JL Pol’y & Fam 
147 at 174. 
45 Quebec’s Civil Code is similar but does not use the “best interests” language 
per se. It states as follows in Article 33: “Every decision concerning a child 
shall be taken in light of the child’s interests and the respect of his rights.” 
46 Family Law Act, supra note 3, s 37(1). 
47 Ibid, s 37(2). 





between the child and significant persons, the history of the child’s 
care, the child’s need for stability, and the impact of any family 
violence.48 Other statutes do not provide lists that are nearly so detailed. 
For example, Canada’s federal Divorce Act specifies that “the court 
shall take into consideration only the best interests of the child of the 
marriage as determined by reference to the condition, means, needs and 
other circumstances of the child.”49 In general, judges have a 
considerable degree of discretion to consider any factor, such as race 
or culture, that may be relevant to a child’s best interests, whether or 
not the statute lists the factor explicitly. 
 
No custody legislation in Canada makes specific reference to 
race, perhaps due to concerns that this approach might perpetuate racist 
stereotypes and prejudices.50 Some do, however, refer to culture. 
Perhaps as a result, although there is a distinction between race and 
culture, these two concepts are often blurred in the case law, with 
judges seeming to prefer to address cultural rather than racial 
difference. Even so, only six Canadian statutes relevant to custody and 
access law refer to culture.51 Where culture is mentioned as a factor 
                                                 
 
48  Ibid. 
49 Divorce Act, supra note 3, s 16(8). Sections 16(9) and 16(10) do include 
particular guidelines on the relevance of past conduct and of maximum 
contact. 
50 Carasco, supra note 9 at 23. 
51 Alberta, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, the Northwest Territories, 
and Nunavut list some aspect of culture or heritage as a factor. See Family 
Law Act, SA 2003, c F-4.5, s 18(2)(b)(iii) [FLA Alberta]; Family Maintenance 
Act, CCSM, c F20, 39(2.1)(k); Family Services Act, SNB 1980, c F-2.2, s 1(g); 
Maintenance and Custody Act, RSNS 1989, c 160, s 6(e); Children’s Law Act, 
SNWT 1997, c 14 s 17(2)(c). The Northwest Territories legislation contains a 
unique clause in subsection 17(1): “The merits of an application under this 
Division in respect of custody of or access to a child shall be determined in 
accordance with the best interests of the child, with a recognition that differing 
cultural values and practices must be respected in that determination” (ibid). 





that merits consideration by judges as one of several factors under the 
best interests of the child test, it is listed along with language and 
religion. For example, Alberta’s Family Law Act directs judges as 
follows: 
 
18(2) In determining what is in the best interests of a 
child, the court shall  
(b) consider all the child’s needs and 
circumstances, including  
(iii) the child’s cultural, linguistic, 
religious and spiritual upbringing and 
heritage,52 
 
In no Canadian custody statute is Aboriginal status mentioned, 
in contrast to legislation on child protection and adoption.53 The 
difference between child custody legislation and legislation on child 
protection and adoption may reflect a view that race and Aboriginal 
status are more important when a child may be removed from a birth 
family than when a custody dispute between parents is at issue.54 
                                                 
 
52 FLA Alberta, supra note 51. 
53 See e.g. Child, Family and Community Service Act, RSBC 1996, c 46, s 2 [BC 
CFCSA]; Adoption Act, RSBC 1996, c 5, s 3. This discrepancy figured in the 
British Columbia case DH v HM, [1999] 1 SCR 761, 172 DLR (4th) 305, 
which involved a mixed race child who had Aboriginal heritage. The best 
interests test from the BC CFCSA was cited by the BC Court of Appeal in a 
custody determination rather than the test in the BC Family Relations Act, 
RSBC 1996, c 128, s 24(1), which did not refer to Aboriginal status.  
54 See Carol J Rogerson, “Developments in Family Law: The 20012002 Term” 
(2002) 18 SCLR (2d) 335 at 35859; Eileen M Blackwood, “Race as a Factor 
in Custody and Adoption Disputes: Palmore v Sidoti” (1985) 71 Cornell L 
Rev 209 at 21819; Twila L Perry, “Race and Child Placement: The Best 
Interests Test and the Cost of Discretion” (1990) 29 J Fam L 51. As Bastarache 
J. stated in Van de Perre, supra note 1 at para 40, “[t]he adoption and custody 
contexts may differ because the adopted child will generally cease to have 





Turning to countries that share Canada’s legal development 
from the English common law, we found that legislation in Australia, 
New Zealand, South Africa, and some American States also uses 
“culture” as a marker rather than race, listing the child’s or parents’ 
culture as a factor in the best interests of the child test.55 Some also 
refer to a child’s indigenous status. More directive language tends to 
be used than that which is seen in Canada’s legislation. For example, 
in New Zealand’s Care of Children Act, a principle relevant to the 
child’s welfare and best interests is that “the child’s identity (including, 
without limitation, his or her culture, language, and religious 
denomination and practice) should be preserved and strengthened.”56 
In California, legislation regarding indigenous children directs 
decision-makers to consider the placement that recognizes the “unique 
values of the child’s tribal culture and is best able to assist the child in 
establishing, developing, and maintaining a political, cultural, and 
social relationship with the child’s tribe and tribal community.”57 In 
South Africa, the Children’s Act, 2005 mentions as factors that must 
be considered: 
 
 (f) the need for the child-  
(ii) to maintain a connection with his or her 
family, extended family, culture or tradition;  
(h) the child's physical and emotional security and his 
or her intellectual, emotional, social and cultural 
development;58 
                                                 
 
contact with the biological parent while custody will generally favour contact 
with both parents.”  
55 For a critique of the Australian statute’s approach to “culture” see generally 
Chew, supra note 34. 
56 Care of Children Act 2004 (NZ), 2004/90, s 5. 
57 California Family Code, § 175(a). 
58 Children’s Act, 2005, (S Afr), No 38 of 2005, s 7(f). 





Australia’s Family Law Act 1975, lists as an additional factor to be 
considered: 
 
(g) the maturity, sex, lifestyle and background 
(including lifestyle, culture and traditions) of the child 
and of either of the child’s parents, and any other 
characteristics of the child that the court thinks are 
relevant; 59 
 
We will address the question of whether more directive statutory 
language on race or culture or both would make a difference to judicial 
decision making in our conclusion. 
 
THE LEADING CASE: VAN DE PERRE V. EDWARDS 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada last heard a case dealing with custody 
and access and a mixed race child in 2001—Van de Perre v. Edwards.60 
Due to its importance as one of the few Supreme Court 
pronouncements on the relevance of race in Canadian society 
generally, and on mixed race children in custody disputes specifically, 
we discuss it prior to our case law review. In addition, the case involved 
other significant questions of gender, marital status, and class, 
illustrating how difficult it can be to treat particular factors, such as 
race, in isolation from others. Van de Perre is routinely cited by 
Canadian courts, often for the point that the decision of trial judges 
who have seen and heard all the evidence must be given great deference 
by appellate courts.61 Our research suggests, however, that it has not 
made as much difference to how decisions are made in cases involving 
mixed race children as might have been expected. 
 
                                                 
 
59 Family Law Act 1975, (Aus), No 53 of 1975 as amended, s 60CC, (3)(g). 
60 Supra note 1; see also DH v HM, supra note 53. 
61 See e.g. Fitzgibbon v Fitzgibbon, 2014 BCCA 403, 65 BCLR (5th) 131. 





Van de Perre v. Edwards involved a mixed race child named 
Elijah, the biological son of Kimberley Van de Perre, a young white 
woman living in the Vancouver area, and Theodore (Blue) Edwards, 
an African American man. He was married to another woman 
(Valerie), with whom he had twin girls. Mr. Edwards had an affair with 
Ms. Van de Perre, who was ten years his junior, while playing 
professional basketball for a Vancouver team. The Edwards lived in 
the Vancouver area at the time of the trial, but then relocated to North 
Carolina. At trial, the mother, Ms. Van de Perre, was awarded custody, 
with Mr. Edwards receiving joint guardianship and four one-week 
access periods per calendar year. The British Columbia Court of 
Appeal overturned that order and awarded joint custody to Mr. 
Edwards and his wife, with generous access to Ms. Van de Perre, who 
retained joint guardianship. In doing so, the Court of Appeal 
emphasized the mixed race heritage of the child more than had the trial 
judge. The Supreme Court of Canada restored the trial decision, 
returning custody to the mother. 
  
A review of the appeal books indicates that race was not 
invoked by the parties at trial nearly to the same extent as was evidence 
related to gender, history of care, sexuality (promiscuity), and family 
form.62 That said, the controversy about the weight that race should 
carry in a custody case arguably elevated the case to a higher status as 
a media item63 than it otherwise might have achieved, especially when 
combined with the celebrity status of Blue Edwards.  
 
Factors in favour of the father, other than the fact that he was 
the racialized parent of a mixed race child who presented as “Black,” 
included his financial stability (wealth) and his offer of a traditional 
family form with his wife as stay-at-home mother. In contrast, the 
                                                 
 
62 The authors were able to review the appeal books, which included many 
excerpts from transcripts, thanks to the generosity of the lawyer for Ms. Van 
de Perre. 
63 See Williams, supra note 5. 





mother was a single parent without many resources, although she had 
been primarily responsible for the son since his birth and had extended-
family support. The trial judge, Warren J., acknowledged that Elijah 
needed exposure to his African-American heritage and culture, but he 
also acknowledged that Elijah was mixed race and, as such, his white 
Canadian heritage must also be considered.64 Racism as such was not 
discussed, and Elijah’s two racial heritages were essentially given 
equal consideration. 
 
The trial judge emphasized the “overarching need for the child 
to be in a stable and loving environment”65 and concluded that the 
mother “has been the primary caregiver for Elijah who by all accounts 
is a bright, cheerful and healthy little boy who, I find on the evidence, 
has firmly bonded with his mother.”66 In addition to emphasizing the 
solid history of care by the mother, Warren J. was not confident that 
the Edwards’ marriage would survive Mr. Edwards’ history of extra-
marital affairs, thus making any evidence about Valerie Edwards as an 
excellent parent less pertinent. Overall, then, the trial judge resisted the 
efforts of Mr. Edwards to paint Ms. Van de Perre as a promiscuous 
single mother without education or stability, and emphasized the 
primary caregiving role that the mother had played “under the 
extremely difficult circumstances of this very hotly contested 
litigation.”67 
 
In reversing the trial decision, Newbury J.A. found the trial 
judge erred in not engaging in a close analysis of factors related to Ms. 
Van de Perre’s lack of a grade 12 education, her lifestyle, and her 
character.68 Newbury J.A. further felt that the trial judge had been 
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65 Ibid at para 80. 
66 Ibid at para 83. 
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diverted by arguments concerning Mr. Edwards’ affairs and that his 
personal life should be treated separately from his ability as a parent. 
She decided it was an error in law to consider Blue Edwards in isolation 
from the rest of his family.69 The Court of Appeal considered the 
Edwards’ family situation to be “superior,” added Valerie Edwards as 
a party to the custody claim, and described Ms. Van de Perre’s 
childhood as a “rather troubled family background.”70 
 
Significantly, Newbury J.A. also found that the trial judge 
should have considered culture, ethnicity, and race and that these 
factors weighed in favour of Elijah’s living with the Edwards: 
 
If it is correct that Elijah will be seen by the world at 
large as “being black”, it would obviously be in his 
interests to live with a parent or family who can nurture 
his identity as a person of colour and who can appreciate 
and understand the day-to-day realities that black 
people face in North American society—including 
discrimination and racism in various forms.71 
 
Although Newbury J.A. was careful to state that racial considerations 
were not determinative in this case, overall, the Court of Appeal 
interpreted the evidence more sympathetically in relation to the 
Edwards and resisted efforts to find good parenting by the mother. 
Although race was not discussed extensively, it was taken to be a more 
significant factor than in the trial decision. The diminished focus on the 
history of care by the mother and the negative evidence about her was 
enough to persuade the Court of Appeal to change custody to the 
Edwards. 
 
                                                 
 
69 Ibid at para 9. 
70 Ibid at para 16.  
71 Ibid at para 50.  





The Supreme Court’s main reason for restoring the trial 
decision was that the Court of Appeal was wrong to reconsider the 
evidence because there was no indication that the trial judge had made 
a material error.72 With regard to Valerie Edwards, Bastarache J. said: 
“A trial judge cannot give custody to a father merely because his wife 
is a good mother. Her presence is a factor but, overall, the court must 
consider if the applicant would make a good father in her absence.”73 
 
As for race, Bastarache J., writing for the Court, said that “race 
is not a determinative factor and its importance will depend greatly on 
the facts.”74 The Supreme Court also referred to the argument of the 
interveners (the African Canadian Legal Clinic, the Association of 
Black Social Workers, and the Jamaican Canadian Association) that a 
biracial child needs key tools in order to foster racial identity and pride, 
such as the means to deal with racism and develop a positive racial 
identity.75 However, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the 
intervener’s argument that race always would be a crucial factor and 
should never be ignored in custody decisions. The intervener had not 
advocated that the minority parent should necessarily be granted 
custody but did submit that “[r]ace is an important or ‘major’ factor, 
which must be given explicit consideration and considerable weight in 
custody and access cases.”76 They suggested that the question was 
which parent would best be able to contribute to a healthy racial 
                                                 
 
72 Van de Perre, supra note 1 at para 35. 
73 Ibid at para 30. Arguably this statement took account of feminist analyses of 
custody cases in which a father’s ability to offer a substitute mother to a child 
in the form of a new wife or a paternal grandmother has sometimes trumped 
a mother’s claim. See, for example, Boyd, supra note 4 at 9699, 11011. 
74 Van de Perre, supra note 1 at para 39. 
75 Ibid at para 37. 
76 African Canadian Legal Clinic, The Association of Black Social Workers & 
The Jamaican Canadian Association, Factum of the Interveners in Van de 
Perre v Edward, para 3. 





socialization and overall healthy development of the child, and which 
parent would facilitate contact and development of racial identity in a 
manner that avoided conflict, discord, and disharmony.77 They also 
submitted that, in addition to race being given explicit, independent 
consideration, the historical and social context of racialized groups 
should inform each specific best-interests factor considered by a 
court.78 
 
In contrast to the interveners’ argument, the Supreme Court 
gave little guidance to trial judges on the way in which factors such as 
race, culture, and caregiving should be considered, weighted, or 
balanced in relation to one another. Indeed, the Court appeared to 
reduce the question of race to only one of many factors that may be 
“considered in determining personal identity; the relevancy of this 
factor depends on the context.”79 Perhaps most significantly, 
Bastarache J. added that “[o]ther factors are more directly related to 
primary needs and must be considered in priority.”80 He stated that 
“[r]ace can be a factor in determining the best interests of the child 
because it is connected to the culture, identity and emotional well-
being of the child,”81 and added: 
 
I would therefore agree that evidence regarding the so-
called “cultural dilemma” of biracial children (i.e. the 
conflict that arises from belonging to two races where 
one may be dominant for one reason or another) is 
                                                 
 
77 Ibid at paras 90–91.  
78 Ibid at para 93.  
79  Ibid at para 38. 
80 Ibid at para 38. Echoes of Racine v Woods, [1983] 2 SCR 173, [1983] SCCA 
No 322 can be traced here, although the SCC does not refer to Racine v Woods 
in Van de Perre. See text below at notes 13233 for a discussion of Racine v 
Woods. 
81 Van de Perre, supra note 1 at para 40. 





relevant and should always be accepted.  But the 
significance of evidence relating to race in any given 
custody case must be carefully considered by the trial 
judge.82 
 
Bastarache J. observed that “the trial judge noted that this issue was 
not determinative and that, in this case, Elijah would be in a more stable 
and loving environment if custody was granted to the [mother].”83 He 
thus emphasized stability and the history of care, as did the trial judge, 
and added that the Court of Appeal had given “disproportionate 
emphasis” to the issue of race on its own initiative.84 
 
Although opinion on the Supreme Court’s approach in Van de 
Perre v. Edwards was mixed, several commentators suggested race 
should have been emphasized to a greater extent.85 
 
CASE LAW ANALYSIS 
 
As we have seen, Van de Perre left the field open to a fairly wide 
judicial discretion in how to deal with mixed race children. In the 
remainder of this article, we review judicial decisions that were 
rendered before and after the Van de Perre case.86 After introducing 
                                                 
 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid at para 41. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Law, supra note 8; Joanna L Radbord, “Equality and the Law of Custody and 
Access” (2004) 6:1 J Assoc for Research on Mothering 28; Zahara Suleman, 
“Race(ing) Family Law: A Feminist Critical Race Analysis of the “Best 
Interests of the Child” Test and the Impact for Racialized Women in Custody 
and Access Cases” (LLM Thesis, University of Victoria Faculty of Law, 
2006) Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada, 2007. 
86 These cases were compiled through a comprehensive online search (via the 
websites LexisNexis Quicklaw, Westlaw, and CanLII) for family law cases 
using search terms such as “race,” “mixed race,” “biracial,” “mixed heritage,” 





our qualitative study we use eight categories to try to understand how 
race (and culture) are used in the cases:  
 
(A) Judicial Racism,  
(B) Essentialist “Race-Matching,” 
(C) Weighing Race and Culture against Other 
Factors, 
(D) Fostering a Supportive Approach to Mixed Race 
 Heritage,  
(E) Dismissing Race as a Factor: Evidence and 
Strategy,  
(F) The Role of Access,  
(G) Two (Different) Minority Races, and  
(H) Does the White Race Merit Equal 
Consideration? 
 
                                                 
 
“ethnicity,” “minority,” and “bicultural.” The leading case on this topic, Van 
de Perre v Edwards, supra note 1, was also noted up in order to locate all 
subsequent cases referencing it. The search was up to date as of December 
2014. Some of the cases that were found are not discussed in this paper, due 
to their limited relevance. These cases include Re Shing, [1898] BCJ No 7, an 
adoption case that discusses whether it was in a child’s interest to be brought 
up in “her own” Chinese culture; Stutt v Stutt, [1993] OJ No 2149, a child 
support case in which an obviously mixed race child was deemed to not be the 
child of the white respondent father; NN v TK, [1998] QJ No 4259, in which 
the white father raised concerns that the Nigerian mother might return to 
Nigeria with their child; SSK v JS, [2002] Nu J No 3, in which the Court 
engaged with evidence regarding the tradition of Inuit customary adoption; 
and IR v LR, [2007] BCJ No 2684, in which a grandmother was granted sole 
custody and was permitted to move with her mixed race grandchildren to 
Panama. None of the reported cases involved a dispute between same-sex 
parents, although one reported case involved a dispute between a lesbian 
mother (in a relationship with another woman) and a biological father with 
whom the mother was no longer in a relationship. Both parents were 
Aboriginal: JSB v DLS (2004), [2004] 3 CNLR 110. 





On occasion, we discuss cases that talk about religious, linguistic, or 
cultural heritage rather than those framed in terms of race. This is 
because judges often speak about race and culture in a very unclear and 
euphemistic manner. Cases involving children who we can assume are 
racialized (based on the identification of their parents’ ethnicities in 
judgments) may not directly discuss race, and instead use the 
terminology of culture and language to address what are actually issues 
of racial discrimination and racism. (For more on this, see the section 
“Approaches to Race, Culture, and Ethnicity” above.) 
 
The majority of cases that we found that mentioned race or 
culture in relation to a mixed race child came from three provinces: 
Nova Scotia (23 out of 89 cases), Ontario (20 out of 89 cases), and BC 
(24 out of 89 cases). The high number of cases from Ontario and BC is 
perhaps unsurprising, given their larger populations (Ontario has the 
highest population in Canada, and BC has the third highest).87 
However, Nova Scotia only has the seventh highest per cent of the 
national population,88 yet produced almost a quarter of the cases. Apart 
from this interesting incongruity, no meaningful differences emerged 
                                                 
 
87 See Statistics Canada, “Population and dwelling counts, for Canada, provinces 
and territories, 2011 and 2006 censuses” (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2014), 
online: <www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2011/dp-pd/hlt-fst/pd-
pl/Table-Tableau.cfm?LANG=Eng&T=101&S=50&O=A> [Statistics 
Canada, “Population and dwelling counts”]. Note that Ontario and BC also 
have some of the highest proportions of racialized people in Canada. See 
Statistics Canada, “Immigration and Ethnocultural Diversity in Canada” in 
National Household Survey: Analytical Products, Catalogue No 99-010-X 
(Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2011), online: <www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-
enm/2011/as-sa/99-010-x/99-010-x2011001-eng.cfm>.  
88 Statistics Canada, “Population and dwelling counts”, supra note 87. Nova 
Scotia also has quite a low proportion of racialized people, at just 5.2%, 
compared to 19.1% for Canada generally. See Statistics Canada, “NHS Focus 
on Geography Survey – Nova Scotia” (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2014), 
online: <www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/as-sa/fogs-spg/Pages/FOG. 
cfm?lang=E&level=2&GeoCode=12>. 





in relation to how courts in different geographical areas of Canada dealt 
with mixed race custody issues. Of course it must be emphasized that 
our study is qualitative and limited by the fact that most custody 
disputes are resolved out of court. As well, many are unreported. 
Nevertheless, the reported cases guide other decisions and other 
methods of dispute resolution, and are thus worthwhile studying. 
 
The cases do not reveal meaningful differences between how 
different levels of court treated issues of race. The vast majority of 
custody cases mentioning race are trial-level decisions, with only a 
handful of appellate decisions. When race is raised as an issue in an 
appeal case, a more in-depth discussion of racial issues can ensue (as 
in Van de Perre), but sometimes the appeal court merely affirms that 
there is no evidence of race being relevant and dismisses the race issue 
that was raised.89 
 
Our study is limited, due not only to the existence of 
unreported decisions, but also to the fact that we cannot know how 
many decisions involving a mixed race child never made any mention 
of the child’s mixed background. Such cases could not have been 
captured by our search, although their very absence may suggest 
something about how courts deal with custody disputes over mixed 
race children—namely that their mixed backgrounds were not viewed 
as relevant. Moreover, even when cases do mention some aspect of the 
mixed racial or cultural background of a child, it can be difficult to 
isolate the impact of race and culture as discrete factors. Race or culture 
may be mentioned, but so are many other issues that are relevant to 
determination of the best interests of a child. Consequently, it is not 
always possible to know the true extent to which race or culture 
contributed to the end result, unless the judge is explicit on this point. 
These methodological issues are due to silences in judicial discourse 
and questions about what judicial words actually reveal about judicial 
thought processes, perhaps especially in a field where it is unclear to 
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what extent race or culture should be accorded weight. As we discussed 
in the section “Approaches to Race, Culture, and Ethnicity,” it is not 
uncommon for Canadians to resort to silence when uncomfortable 
questions are raised about racial difference and racism. 
 
We did find cases in which the child was white,90 but from 
different cultural heritages. These cases suggest that race and culture 
are not brought up as often for white children, and that, when they are 
raised, are not considered to be as important as for racialized children. 
This pattern reflects the assumption that whiteness is the racial norm 
in Canada and is, accordingly, taken for granted. The cases that 
mention race and culture almost always involve racialized children. 
Where culture and cultural heritage are raised in cases involving white 
children, judges tend not to attach as much significance to these issues 
as in the cases involving racialized children. For instance, in the early 
1957 case Maat v. Hepton,91 the Dutch parents of children that had 
been adopted into a non-Dutch family were seeking to regain custody. 
In considering whether the trial judge had overlooked the issue of 
culture, the appeal judge said that exposure to Dutch culture would be 
important if the children were to be brought up in the Netherlands. 
Since they were to be brought up in Canada, however, it was of “equal 
importance” that they be immersed in Canadian culture (with their non-
Dutch adoptive parents, who maintained custody). The Court did not 
dismiss outright the importance of the minority culture, but it was 
clearly not an important factor in the decision. It is possible that the 
judge assumed that because the children appeared white, they would 
be better able to blend into mainstream Canadian society (compared to 
a racialized child), and therefore would not feel much need to engage 
                                                 
 
90 With respect to nomenclature, there was little consistency in the case law with 
respect to how judges referred to the racial categorization of the people 
appearing before them. Some judges referred to non-racialized individuals as 
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91 [1957] OR 64, 7 DLR (2d) 488 (CA). This case was appealed at the Supreme 
Court of Canada, but the Court did not discuss culture in its decision. See 
Hepton v Maat, [1957] SCR 606, 10 DLR (2d) 1.  





strongly with their minority culture.92 This case raises the question of 
whether having a strong connection to a minority culture is more 
relevant to the best interests of children who do not appear to be white.   
 
We now turn to a more detailed discussion of the cases under 




Unsurprisingly, some older custody cases, including those outside our 
sample, demonstrate a more explicitly racist attitude.93 For instance, in 
1982 in Re Comeau,94 custody of a white child was awarded to the 
father, in part because the mother’s interracial relationship with a Black 
man was thought to not be in the child’s best interests.95 
                                                 
 
92 This perspective echoes the “melting pot” theory of racial and cultural 
assimilation. This theory is largely discredited today, but advocates that 
different groups synthesize together to form a new group rather than maintain 
their original identities. Implicit in this theory is the idea that it is preferable 
not to retain and perpetuate distinct minority cultures and that all people 
should instead blend into a common cultural milieu. For an exploration and 
critique of the “melting pot” theory, see Driedger & Halli, “Racial 
Integration”, supra note 23 in Driedger & Halli, supra note 15, at 5558. 
93 It is unsurprising that racism is more apparent in older cases because these 
cases predate the prevalence of critical legal approaches to race and racism, 
which became more common after the first Critical Race Theory workshop, 
which was held in 1989 in Madison, Wisconsin. See Richard Delgado & Jean 
Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Introduction (New York: New York 
University Press, 2012) at 4. 
94 [1982] NSJ No 84. 
95 Ibid at para 29. This case did not involve a mixed race child, and as such was 
not included in our case law sample. However, it serves as a Canadian parallel 
to the landmark 1984 US case of Palmore v Sidoti (466 US 429), which 
involved a similar set of facts, with the trial level decision saying that it would 
not be in a white child’s best interests to be in a mixed race home due to the 
potential negative effects of racial difference and racism on the child. Palmore 





Racist attitudes are not just a thing of the past, however. Judges 
have made explicitly racist comments in their custody determinations 
as recently as 1999. In D.T.L. v. L. (Police Service),96 Justice Barakett 
made several derogatory comments about an Aboriginal mother, 
saying that two “blonde freckled”97 children had been “brainwashed 
away from the real world into a child like myth of pow-wows and 
rituals” by their mother.98 Justice Barakett also said the children had 
been “indoctrinated into Indian culture,”99 suggesting that, based on 
their white appearance, their rightful place was in the non-Aboriginal 
community. This decision by Justice Frank G. Barakett in the “Audrey 
Isaac” case was the subject of complaints by several First Nations 
organizations to the Canadian Judicial Council. The fundamental 
concerns highlighted by these complaints included the fact that Justice 
Barakett ignored Ms. Isaac’s ex-husband’s history of criminal assault 
against her and her mother; that he ignored the fact that Mr. Isaac 
signed false affidavits; that he demonstrated insensitivity, ignorance, 
and bias concerning First Nations people; that his biased views unfairly 
affected Ms. Isaac’s and her children’s rights; and that his claims of 
brainwashing and indoctrination were not grounded in the evidence.100 
The Canadian Judicial Council panel that reviewed the case expressed 
their disapproval of Justice Barakett’s statements, but concluded that 
he was sincere in the recognition of his errors, and that his statements 
                                                 
 
v Sidoti went to the United States Supreme Court, where it was ultimately 
found that it was improper for courts to give effect to private racial biases in 
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96 [2000] RDF 35, [1999] QJ No 5364 [cited to QJ]. 
97 Ibid at para 15. 
98 Ibid at para 18.  
99 Ibid at para 14.  
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did not affect the outcome of the case.101 He affirmed that he would 
attend seminars to improve his understanding of Aboriginal culture, 
and was deemed capable of continuing as a judge serving the public.102 
 
More recent decisions likely still exhibit elements of racism, 
but do so more subtly. Although many judges discuss the value that 
minority cultures and identification with a racial minority can offer, 
whiteness is still situated as the normative racial identity. When two 
parents of different racial or cultural backgrounds are engaged in a 
custody dispute, the race or culture of the non-white parent is often 
described, but that of the white parent is left to be assumed, giving the 
sense that the author of the judgment considered whiteness to be the 
norm or the neutral racial category in Canada. Although it is the 
majority race in (most of) Canada, the assumption of neutrality is 
problematic and reinforces assumptions of whites being racially 
superior, as discussed in the section “Approaches to Race, Culture, and 
Ethnicity.” The cases Kucherawy v. Gill,103 W.D. v. L.C.,104 D.M. v. 
A.G.L.,105 R.C. v. S.S.,106 D.G.E.E. v. J.E.,107 Ho v. Gallinger,108 P.M.S. 
v. G.T.,109 Sherwood v. Pardo,110 and Allen v. Wu111 are all instances of 
                                                 
 
101  Ibid at 25964. 
102 Ibid at 25960.  
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this tendency to presume and normalize whiteness. One example can 
be found in the case D.G.E.E. v. J.E., in which it was stated that “[t]he 
child is half Filipino, and the mother promises to expose her child to 
the rich cultural heritage of the Philippines.”112 Nowhere in the case 
does it also state that the child is part white, nor is there any discussion 
of the unique cultural enrichment that the white father could offer. 
 
Essentialist “Race-matching”  
 
An essentialist race-matching approach to custody does not attempt to 
address the nuances of the development of racial identity or explain 
why the racialized parent might be better equipped to care for a mixed 
race child. This approach appears in some older cases113 but, as we shall 
see,114 more recent decisions awarding custody of a mixed race child 
to his or her racialized parent tend to be based primarily on reasons 
other than race (such as stability, parenting history, bonding, financial 
means, etc.—the same reasons cited when giving custody to white 
parents). If these decisions do discuss race or culture, the judgments 
comment on why the racialized parent is better suited to raising the 
biracial child (for instance, because they have demonstrated a greater 
willingness or ability to expose the child to both sides of his or her 
heritage or they are more willing to foster access). As a result, it is 
difficult to isolate the extent to which essentialist or reductive race-
matching has motivated these decisions.  
 
                                                 
 
112 Supra note 107 at para 46. 
113 But, importantly, not in all older cases. For instance, GG c J-LF, [1992] RDF 
150 is a Quebec appeal decision that is interesting because it demonstrates a 
distancing from race matching, which one may not expect at first from an 
older case. Though the majority and minority judgments disagreed on the 
result on appeal, they both agreed that considering a child’s skin colour was 
irrelevant and impermissible. 
114 See the section “When the Racialized Parent Gets Custody” below. 





The 1973 case Hayre v. Hayre115 is perhaps the best known 
instance of race-matching in Canadian custody case law. The Court 
said that society would not “permit” the part-Punjabi child any identity 
other than Sikh, and the white mother would never be able to cope with 
the task of bringing her son up with that identity. Although the judge 
did not say that the child would necessarily experience racism because 
of his racial appearance, he did say that the child would not have a 
choice in what his racial identity (and his consequent place in society, 
one can assume) would be, and custody was awarded to the “Sikh by 
race and religion” father despite evidence of the father’s abuse, older 
siblings supporting the mother, and the mother being a fit and loving 
parent that the judge said he would ordinarily incline towards in a 
custody decision. The judge briefly commented on how the father 
would be capable of bringing up the child within the language, religion, 
and cultural traditions of the Sikhs,116 but did not otherwise address 
why race was the main motivating factor behind his decision, leaving 
one to assume that the decision was primarily the result of essentialist 
race-matching.  
 
Similarly, in the 1942 case, W. v. A.K.,117 although the racial 
appearance of an infant with a Chinese father and an Aboriginal mother 
was not explicitly discussed, the assumption that the child would be 
seen as Chinese (and should therefore live among Chinese people) can 
be inferred from the fact that one of the Court’s considerations was that 
one particular neighbourhood would be better for the child than 
another, because it had a greater population of children of Chinese 
descent (or, as the decision says, of the child’s “own kind”).118 In this 
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116 This can be seen as an example of the common judicial failure to distinguish 
between racial and cultural factors. See the section “Approaches to Race, 
Culture, and Ethnicity” above. 
117 [1942] OJ No 136.  
118 The Court of Appeal in Van de Perre, supra note 68 at para 51, 184 DLR (4th) 
486 made a similar comment, saying the Edwards were better suited to raising 





case, the father sought custody and the mother (deemed to have “loose 
character”) hoped to complete the formal adoption of the child to a 
Chinese couple. The application was dismissed and custody was not 
given to the father for several reasons (particularly his lack of 
finances), and it was furthermore noted that the adoptive parents’ 
Chinese neighbourhood would be more suitable for the child. 
 
A more recent (2000) case, Kassel v. Louie,119 is sometimes 
referred to as an example of race-matching,120 because a part-Chinese 
boy who resembled his Chinese father was placed with his father after 
the Court put considerable weight on the fact that they looked similar. 
However, the judgment also took into account the fact that the child 
would have more continuity and stability if he lived with his father, so 
it is difficult to know the real extent to which the decision was 
motivated by essentialist race-matching. On a similar note, the 
judgment in Thompson v. Murphy121 said that a part-white, part-Black 
child was “of the same race” as his Black father, and ordered joint 
custody.122 However, the decision commented on why this racial 
resemblance was important, saying that the child would need a racial 
role model in multicultural Canadian society, and also considered 
many other factors apart from race in the best interests of the child 
analysis. It is accordingly difficult to determine the true extent to which 
                                                 
 
Elijah in part because “being raised in an Afro-American family in a part of 
the world where the black population is proportionately greater than it is here, 
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essentialist race-matching motivated the decision. In general, 
contemporary judges do not appear to adopt an explicit race-matching 
approach in the way that happened in some earlier decisions. 
 
Weighing Race and Culture against Other Factors 
 
In this section, we turn to the most important insights of our study. We 
first discuss how race and culture tend to be discussed before analyzing 
the cases according to: (i) When the Racialized Parent Loses Custody; 
(ii) When Joint Custody is Ordered; and (iii) When the Racialized 
Parent is Awarded Custody. 
 
Overall, race per se does not emerge as a very important factor 
in the custody cases involving mixed race children. Race and culture 
are, however, typically very intertwined in the judicial discourse. 
When differences between parents could be cast as either racial 
differences or cultural differences, it is common for judges to prefer 
the latter framing. As mentioned in the section “Legislative Analysis,” 
legislation is often silent on race or culture, but when a reference is 
made, it is to culture only. The judicial preference to refer to culture 
may partly reflect the legislative approach. It may also reflect 
discomfort around the blatant discussion of race and racism, or a desire 
to cast a broad semantic net that assumes racial issues fall within the 
scope of cultural issues. In any case, it is important to note that race is 
typically not made explicit in the case law in the same way that culture 
is.123 
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Racial and cultural issues—such as a parent’s ability to impart 
racial or cultural knowledge—seem to become important when all 
other factors, such as stability, the child’s attachment to the parents, 
parental willingness to foster access, and financial means, are equal. 
What this means is that racial and cultural factors (and recall that these 
are often conflated) will only work in a parent’s favour if no other 
factors tip the scales towards one or the other parent. Racialized parents 
and parents belonging to minority cultures are not automatically 
favoured because of these aspects of their (and their children’s) 
identity. Rather, before these aspects can have any meaningful weight 
in a best-interests analysis, both parents must be scrutinized on all other 
bases to reveal whether they are on equal footing. Such scrutiny will 
likely result in various other factors (such as financial stability and 
history of care) working for or against the parents, with one parent 
consequently looking like the more fit parent. In such a scenario, racial 
and cultural factors will not be enough to change the overall balance of 
factors. All other things are rarely equal enough for race and culture to 
make an impact in a placement decision.124 
 
This judicial method of considering racial and cultural issues 
is illustrated by S.H. v. A.M.,125 which used the phrase “all other things 
being equal”126 when discussing the fact that race has the greatest 
impact on a child custody decision when the parents are otherwise on 
equal footing. In this case, the judge acknowledged that the racialized 
mother had greater “cultural competence” and would be better able to 
equip her child with the tools needed to deal with being racialized.127 
                                                 
 
124 Similarly, the tender-years doctrine or maternal preference was supposed to 
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However, custody was still awarded to the white paternal grandparents, 
because the child had bonded more with them.  
 
Further demonstrating the idea that race and culture do not 
always have a consistent level of impact on a decision is the fact that 
race is sometimes not even discussed in cases involving mixed race 
children. In these cases, it was raised neither by the parties or the judge, 
presumably because other factors were understood by all people 
involved to be more important. One can assume this was the case in 
Phelps v. Andersen,128 which involved a child the court identified as 
mixed race (with a Black father and a white mother), but did not 
analyze race and culture, instead focusing on stability of residence and 
ability to meet the child’s day-to-day care needs. 
 
More often, race is at least mentioned, but is not determined to 
be significant enough to decide the outcome of a custody case. First, as 
we discuss in more detail immediately below, when the white parent 
receives custody, the court will typically say that more factors overall 
weigh in the white parent’s favour. Often, when this is so, the fact that 
the white parent says they are willing to educate the child about their 
biracial heritage is seen by the court as sufficient to address any 
potential issues regarding race and culture. As the section “The Role 
of Access” will show below, access can be another device by which 
judges assume that children will be exposed to the racial heritage of the 
non-custodial parent. Second, when joint custody is ordered, a 
consideration of all of the factors puts the parents on equal footing, and 
race and culture do not tip the scales in favour of one parent or the 
other. Third, in some cases, issues of race and culture figure more 
prominently than in others, but when the racialized parent receives 
custody, many other non-racial/non-cultural factors usually weigh in 
favour of the racialized parent.  
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When the Racialized Parent Loses Custody: Race and Culture are 
Outweighed by Other Factors 
 
In several cases, race and culture are outweighed by other factors: 
typically, a combination of non-racial and non-cultural factors. For 
instance, in Costa v. Costa,129 the minority (Catholic Portuguese) father 
did not receive custody because he was overall less able to meet the 
children’s needs. Similarly, in Anderson v. Williams,130 custody was 
not awarded to the Black father, even though the Court acknowledged 
the relevance of racial issues to the child’s well-being. The reason for 
the decision was that the father did not have a very good parenting 
history, whereas the mother was an overall more fit parent. In Allen v. 
Wu,131 culture was deemed an important factor for the part-Chinese 
children, but the other factors considered still combined to outweigh 
culture, and the white father received custody. In G.W.Z. v. S.M.Z.,132 
an Aboriginal mother’s application to vary a custody order was denied 
when the Court said that culture was merely one factor, and the white 
father retained custody. Demonstrating how non-racial factors can 
outweigh racial and cultural ones in the adoption context is P.C. v. 
P.C.C-G.,133 in which a child’s white Croatian-Canadian stepfather and 
mother sought to dispense with the consent of the child’s Mexican 
father to the adoption of the child. Consent was dispensed with, 
because the father did not have a history of caring for or regularly 
seeing the child, had been a violent partner, and did not pay child 
support. The father’s argument that adoption would deprive the child 
of exposure to her Mexican cultural heritage was heavily outweighed 
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by other issues, and the white parents were deemed able to raise the 
child with a healthy sense of cultural identity without the biological 
father’s involvement.  
 
In the well-known and much cited case of Racine v. Woods,134 
a dispute between white and Métis foster parents and an Aboriginal 
biological mother, race was outweighed by the bond the Aboriginal 
child had formed over time with the foster parents.135 Sometimes 
financial and environmental needs are also cited as important factors 
that appear to trump race and cultural concerns. In K.J.S. v. M.T.,136 
even though the child’s Inuit mother was better able to provide for the 
child’s cultural needs, the white father was better able to provide for 
the child’s financial and environmental needs, and was therefore 
awarded custody. A similar scenario occurred in R.N.G. v. K.Q.N.G.,137 
in which the Inuit mother was only granted access, while her Caucasian 
ex-partner received sole custody due to his history of caring for the 
children, family support, and healthier mental state (even though the 
judge acknowledged the importance of the children’s cultural 
heritage). D.H. v. H.M.138 was a custody case between an Aboriginal 
biological grandfather and the white “adoptive” parents of an 
Aboriginal mother who had been removed from her home at an early 
age. The custody award of the grandchild to the white grandparents 
also pointed to race and culture only having been one consideration 
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that was outweighed by others such as economic ability, bonding, and 
maintaining the status quo.139 
 
Willingness to foster access frequently figures as a significant 
issue as well. For instance, in Ffrench v. Ffrench140 race was 
considered, and the racialized father argued that only he could impart 
cultural knowledge and the necessary tools for his children to deal with 
racism. However, the Court found the father less likely to support 
access than the mother, so even though the Court accepted evidence of 
the reality of racialization and racism, custody was still awarded to the 
white mother. S.B. v. S.H.J.G.141 also saw a white parent receiving 
custody in part because he seemed more willing to support access. 
Similarly, in Sawatzky v. Campbell,142 an Aboriginal father argued that 
only he could support his child’s Aboriginal identity. However, the 
Court said that it would favour the racialized parent only if all else were 
equal. The father had a history of withholding access, there was 
evidence of his less than ideal history of caring for other children, and 
he was deemed to be overall less mature and capable compared to the 
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mother. For these reasons, the white mother received custody. In Nova 
Scotia (Minister of Community Services) v. B.F.,143 although the 
Aboriginal mother argued that she was better able to support the 
children’s biracial, First Nations heritage, the case focused on the fact 
that the white father had a superior parenting plan and history and 
seemed more willing to foster access. 
 
Rushton v. Paris144 is a particularly interesting instance of a 
racialized parent being denied custody, even after racial issues figured 
prominently in the reasons. This decision was written by Judge Corinne 
Sparks, the African Canadian judge mentioned earlier.145 The white 
mother received custody even after Judge Sparks considered at some 
length the significant reality of racism and the difficulties that 
racialized children face. It was determined that the children in question 
were confused at best and resentful at worst of their biracial heritage, 
and Judge Sparks remarked on the fact that the assessment ordered by 
the court did not adequately address or explore issues of race. 
Interestingly, it was also said that the assessor did not hear out the 
father’s concerns about race, and the mother merely “paid lip service” 
about exposing the children to racial and cultural learning.146 There 
had, however, been allegations that the father had been abusive and 
angry, and he had displayed poor judgment during access visits, which 
made him a less suitable parent. Acknowledging that a white mother 
may have trouble with some aspects of raising a racialized child, 
Justice Sparks awarded the mother custody but suggested she take a 
course on parenting biracial children. Judge Sparks also commented on 
the importance of the father engaging the children in cultural activities 
during his access visits. We return to this idea in the section “The Role 
of Access” below. 
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When Joint Custody Is Ordered: Parents on Equal Footing and Race 
and Culture Do Not Tip the Scales 
 
Since the 1980s, joint custody awards have become far more 
common—some would say the norm—in Canadian courts, reflecting 
shifting approaches to fatherhood and motherhood and a valuing of the 
ongoing involvement of parents in a child’s life.147 This pattern can be 
detected in our case sample, arguably as a way to satisfy concerns that 
a child have contact with both aspects of her racial heritage. In A.R.D. 
v. G.B.G.D.,148 joint custody was awarded in a dispute between a 
Malaysian-Chinese-Canadian mother and a white father. Although it 
was acknowledged that residing with the mother would better facilitate 
exposure to Chinese culture, race and culture were deemed to be only 
one factor. Primary residence was to be with the white father, largely 
because of a reluctance to remove the child from Comox, where he had 
been living, and due to concerns about the mother moving to Malaysia. 
Stead v. Stead149 saw a similar outcome, with joint custody and equal 
parenting time awarded to both parents, even though the Métis mother 
was acknowledged as being more able to guide her son regarding his 
Aboriginal heritage, and even though the father had a history of making 
racist comments. Joint custody was also ordered in D.M. v. A.G.L.,150 
with the primary residence being with the white mother and the 
Aboriginal father receiving generous access to support the child’s 
cultural development. Finally, joint custody was awarded to a white 
mother and a Jamaican-Canadian father in the case of Szakacs v. 
Clarke,151 where it was stated that “[t]he fact that an order for joint 
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custody will ensure that the child experiences her full cultural 
inheritance is a bonus,” rather than a determinative factor, suggesting 
that cultural or racial factors did not tip the scales in favour of one 
parent or the other.152 In these cases, the overall balance of factors, 
including those relating to race and culture, seemed to weigh fairly 
evenly for both parents, leading the judges to order joint custody. 
Typically, practical concerns such as the need to relocate the child 
would dictate primary residence, as in A.R.D. v. G.B.G.D.153 
 
When the Racialized Parent Gets Custody: Race and Culture Are Not 
Pivotal Reasons 
 
Typically, when the racialized parent does receive custody, race is not 
the overriding reason. When race and culture do figure more 
prominently in a decision, they will still be combined with other factors 
that tip the scales in favour of the racialized parent. For instance, in 
Gordon v. Mustache,154 custody of a part-Aboriginal child was 
awarded to the Aboriginal mother. The Court stated that culture has to 
be lived on a day-to-day basis and occasionally engaging with it is not 
enough. However, the majority of the decision dealt with issues other 
than race and culture, such as the history of caregiving, the stability of 
the home environment, and parental emotional stability and maturity. 
In Gray v. Reynolds,155 the Black father received custody after the 
Court discussed the effects of racialization and racism, but much time 
was also spent discussing the mother’s history of inadequate day-to-
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day care. Similarly, in Dighe v. Dighe,156 the racialized father was 
awarded custody of the child, but most of the discussion centred on 
how he was a more fit and dedicated parent. In Imamura v. Remus,157 
custody was awarded to the Japanese mother who wished to relocate 
to Japan. The white Canadian father raised the issue of a part-Japanese 
child potentially facing racial discrimination in Japan, but this concern 
was dismissed and most other factors weighed in the mother’s favour. 
Similar sets of facts occurred in Takenaka v. Kaleta158 and P.M.S. v. 
G.T.159 In I.G.C. v. K.A.C.,160 the father, who himself had a mixed 
background with an Aboriginal mother and a Caucasian father, was 
awarded custody, and though the court mentioned his ability to share 
the benefits of his Aboriginal ancestry, the decision also focused on the 
presumably white mother’s poor parenting history. A white stepfather 
was seeking custody of his Black stepdaughter in J.H.F. v. A.M.F.,161 
but custody was awarded to the Black mother. Race was discussed, but 
it was only one of several other factors making the mother the more 
suitable parent. In D.G.E.E. v. J.E.,162 a Filipino mother retained 
custody over the presumably white father and was able to relocate with 
her child to Florida, where her fiancé resided. Race and culture were 
mentioned, but were not a large focus of the judgment. In G.A.C. v. 
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I.C.,163 a custody order was varied to give sole custody to a Black father 
after the white Russian mother removed the child to Russia without 
notifying the father. Race was not discussed apart from mentioning that 
living in multicultural Canada would benefit the child, and more 
discussion was devoted to how the mother had placed her own school 
and training ahead of her mothering duties. Finally, in Yu v. Jordan,164 
a white father questioned a trial judge’s finding regarding the cultural 
benefit his daughter would have by living with her mother and Chinese 
grandmother by saying that the grandmother did not actually reside 
with them full-time. The Court dismissed his appeal, and though the 
Court acknowledged the uncertainty of the evidence regarding the 
grandmother’s residency, it was stated that the numerous other findings 
supported the mother retaining primary residence, again demonstrating 
how race and culture are not the primary focus of judicial decision 
making. 
 
Fostering a Supportive Approach to Mixed Race Heritage 
 
When issues of race or culture are discussed in custody cases, they are 
often discussed in terms of whether each parent would be able to foster 
an open, informed, and supportive approach to the mixed race child 
exploring his or her cultural or racial identity, which typically means 
exploring a racialized identity or a minority cultural identity.165 This 
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principle was articulated in Van de Perre as being based on which 
parent would “best be able to contribute to the child’s healthy racial 
socialization and overall healthy development”166 and drew to some 
extent on the argument of the interveners in that case.167 This parent 
will not always be the racialized parent, and the focus is on the overall 
development of the child, so racial and cultural issues will always be 
considered in conjunction with other factors. As can be seen in many 
of the cases above, considering race and culture in this way along with 
numerous other factors may or may not result in the racialized parent 
being awarded custody. 
 
Cases in which the racialized parent received custody when 
they were deemed to be open to fostering a supportive approach to the 
child’s mixed race heritage include Maier v. Chiao-Maier.168 In Maier, 
custody of a young boy was awarded to his Chinese-Canadian mother 
(who wanted her son to learn about Chinese culture) rather than the 
white father (who did not seem interested in enabling that learning). A 
similar set of circumstances occurred in Larocque v. Markie,169 which 
concerned a part-Mi’kmaq, part-white child. In Camba v. Sparks,170 the 
Court also considered which parent would be better equipped to 
address the needs of a child with a Black mother and a white French-
Canadian father, awarding custody to the child’s Black mother. 
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Similarly, in Hannebohm v. Hannebohm,171 both parents were found to 
be loving and committed, but the Black mother demonstrated a greater 
understanding of the effects of racialization and racism than did the 
white father. In Flemmings v. Collet,172 in which a Black father was 
given custody, a significant concern was that the white maternal family 
had a history of frustrating access to the father, which would impede 
the child benefiting from her dual racial heritage. As a result, the father 
could better support her dual heritage. These cases awarded custody to 
the racialized parent after mentioning the racialized parent’s 
willingness to foster an open approach to the child’s exploration of his 
or her mixed race heritage. However, as was discussed in the section 
“When the Racialized Parent Gets Custody,” race and culture still were 
not the pivotal reasons for the custody determination. Other factors also 
weighed heavily in these parents’ favour, such as history of care and 
stability.  
 
In W.I.W. v. M.A.W.173 and Ho v. Gallinger 174 joint custody 
was ordered, in part because both parents were seen as able to promote 
the child’s mixed race heritage. In Merriam v. McGee,175 joint custody 
was also awarded, but the white father was instructed to further educate 
himself on how to teach his children about their African heritage and 
was prevented from exposing his children to people who might use 
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racial slurs.176 In W.M.W. v. J.W.,177 custody of a part-Aboriginal child 
was given jointly to his Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal extended 
family members, in part due to their willingness and ability to provide 
exposure to Aboriginal culture. 
 
In Young v. Mallett,178 Perkins v. Perkins,179 M.S-O. v. R.K.,180 
and J.D. c. N.W.,181 white mothers were awarded custody, in part 
because they were willing to ensure their mixed race children would 
be able to learn about and engage with their racialized identities. In 
Pigott v. Nochasak,182 a non-Inuit father was awarded custody of a part-
Inuit child, in part because he was very attuned to the child’s needs and 
was well-educated in Inuktitut. In W.D. v. L.C.,183 the white father was 
awarded custody rather than the Cree mother, after the father was 
deemed to be “sufficiently culturally aware” and willing to support his 
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child’s racial and cultural development. The mother also had a history 
of frustrating the father’s access, and was said to put her needs ahead 
of those of the child, which also made the father seem like the more 
appropriate primary caregiver. Similarly, in R.C. v. A.A.,184 the white 
father figure (who was not the biological father, but raised the child 
from birth) received custody over the African-Canadian mother in part 
because he was able and willing to expose the child to his mixed racial 
background. Also weighing in the father’s favour were his more stable 
home, more evident permanent plan for the child, and stronger bond 
with the child.  
 
Langille v. Dossa185 raises the complex question of the 
intersection of racial and religious identities and considers what is 
actually required of a parent who has agreed to expose his or her child 
to a minority culture or religion that he or she does not share. This case 
involved a disagreement between a South Asian Ismaili-Muslim father 
and a white Christian mother regarding the religion and culture in 
which their child would be raised. The father had concerns that the 
mother was not upholding a provision in their separation agreement 
that required the child to be brought up Muslim in addition to being 
exposed to Western culture. The Court said the provision was being 
upheld, and that it was not reasonable to expect the mother, who was 
not herself Muslim, to do anything more than facilitate the father in 
educating the daughter about Islam. This meant that the mother did not 
have to fulfill Muslim religious duties herself, although the Court 
emphasized that the parents must communicate and discuss the process 
of the child’s religious upbringing together.186 
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Dismissing Race as a Factor: Evidence and Strategy  
 
Race is raised in some cases, but is not a factor in the ultimate 
determination because no evidence about its importance is brought 
forward. The requirement that evidence of racial issues must be 
brought forward before race will be judicially considered was an 
outcome of the Van de Perre decision, which concluded that race is 
merely one factor among many for a judge to consider and that race is 
not always relevant in a mixed race custody dispute.187 
 
Race was not ultimately a factor in the decision in S.E.D. v. 
G.S.D.,188 after the judge decided there was no relevant evidence 
regarding race. Also, in G.R.B. v. E.L.M.B.,189 D.D. v. A.S.S.,190 F.E.C. 
v. A.M.Q.,191 Fairfax v. Garland,192 N.H. v. K.H.,193 Stevenson v. 
Kuhn,194 C.C. v. A.S., 195 V.K. v. T.S.,196 and the appeal case C.B. v. 
T.M.,197 the court mentioned or alluded to the fact that the child in 
question was mixed race, but race and culture were not discussed, 
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presumably because neither party submitted evidence of race or culture 
being relevant to the child’s best interests.  
 
In other cases, a parent may allege that the other party is racist, 
but it will not be a factor in the determination if the judge does not 
believe the allegations are true or material or if there is an absence of 
evidence of racism. Allegations of racism were deemed to be untrue in 
A.C.C. v. I.C.G.198 and Young v. Mallett.199 In Sherwood v. Pardo,200 a 
Guatemalan father emphasized the importance of his children learning 
Spanish and engaging with that part of their heritage, and also accused 
the mother of racism. However, the evidence of the assessor who 
originally considered these issues was three years old, and 
circumstances had since changed, so a new report was ordered. This 
outcome emphasizes the importance of providing reliable evidence 
when racism is alleged. Also, in Durham v. Durham,201 which was a 
custody dispute in which neither parent was racialized,202 the father 
accused the mother of being racist for wanting to move their son to an 
area that would have more children who share their culture and 
religious beliefs. The Court, however, determined these cultural issues 
to be immaterial in the determination of the child’s best interests. 
 
In other cases, instead of becoming a meaningful factor in the 
determination, a party’s emphasis on race and culture backfired on the 
party intending to win favour. For instance, in Appiah v. Appiah,203 the 
racialized father was not awarded custody, in part because his attention 
to race and racism was understood by the Court as burdening the 
                                                 
 
198 [1999] BCJ No 963.  
199 Supra note 178.  
200 Supra note 110.  
201 2012 ONSC 7023, [2012] OJ No 5890.  
202 Since this case did not involve a mixed race child, it was not counted in our 
set of 89 cases. 
203 (1996) 20 OTC 154, [1996] OJ No 4433.  





children instead of enriching them. Similarly, in Ffrench v. Ffrench,204 
the Black father did not receive custody in part because he had 
emphasized racial issues so much that the Court thought he was doing 
so in order to deny the mother custody rather than out of genuine 
concern.205 In T.K. v. R.J.H.A.,206 a Chinese-Canadian mother’s 
emphasis on the importance of her part-Chinese, part-white children 
being exposed to more Chinese culture in Toronto compared to 
Victoria during a relocation application also backfired. In this case, the 
Court said that she was bringing up cultural issues strategically rather 
than in consideration of the children’s best interests, since she had not 
made cultural exposure an issue during her marriage and had seemed 
content until that point for her children to live in Victoria.  
 
The Role of Access 
 
As with most custody cases, whichever parent does not receive custody 
almost always is awarded access in one form or another. The access 
parent was the father rather than the mother in somewhat more of the 
cases we reviewed, also reflecting general trends, and the father was 
racialized in slightly more cases.   
 
When the access parent is racialized, as well as when joint 
custody is ordered, the court usually mentions, at least briefly, that 
having at least some time with the child will permit the racialized 
parent to sufficiently impart cultural knowledge or aid with the 
development of the child’s racial identity.207 This was the case for the 
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racialized fathers in K.R.D. v. L.A.L.,208 Anderson v. Williams,209 
Darling v. Chung,210 Colley v. Munro,211 Ffrench v. Ffrench,212 Appiah 
v. Appiah,213 Sawatzky v. Campbell,214 Rushton v. Paris,215 M.S-O. v. 
R.K.,216 Perkins v. Perkins,217 and Young v. Mallett.218 An illustrative 
example of this tendency can be seen in Anderson v. Williams, in which 
the connection between a child’s biracial heritage and the ability to 
explore it through access with a racialized parent was acknowledged. 
The Court said that “[d]uring his access to her, Dr. Williams will have 
a full opportunity to introduce Alexandra to his customs and traditions. 
Ms. Anderson realizes and is sensitive to the fact that because 
Alexandra is part black, she and Alexandra will likely have to cope 
with racial prejudices that may confront them in the future. I am 
satisfied that Ms. Anderson will be able to cope, and that Alexandra 
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will have the benefit of both parents’ support and guidance in dealing 
with black related issues.”219 
 
As in cases that do not deal with mixed race children220 and 
illustrating general judicial reluctance to deny access to a parent, in 
some cases the racialized father is awarded access even when he had a 
notably negative personal or parenting history. In R.C. v. S.S.,221 
supervised access was given to a Black father of “low moral 
character”222 who had a history of substance abuse and violent 
behaviour. In Brusselers v. Shirt,223 in which a white mother opposed 
the Aboriginal father having access due to him having been abusive to 
her, the Court still granted the father access in order to support the 
child’s cultural education. In Costa v. Costa,224 the Portuguese Catholic 
father also received access, albeit strictly outlined and specified. 
Access was also awarded to the Black father in Aziz v. Dolomont,225 
even though he had not been involved in the first five years of the 
child’s life, in order to support the child’s knowledge of his African 
heritage.  
 
Along similar lines, when the racialized father is not in the 
picture, access is sometimes awarded to his racialized extended family 
instead. For example, in S.H.B. v. R.F.,226 custody of a part-Black child 
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was awarded to the white mother, but the mother was instructed to take 
the child to visit the Black paternal side of the family. This also 
happened in White v. Matthews,227 in which access was awarded to a 
mixed race child’s Black paternal grandparents, in part because they 
would be able to “offer racial and cultural perspectives” to the child’s 
life that “may advance his welfare.”228 
 
When the mother is both racialized and denied custody, access 
also tends to be awarded to her to facilitate cultural awareness or racial 
identification. This happened in the following parental custody cases: 
K.J.S. v. M.T.,229 R.N.G. v. K.Q.N.G.,230 W.D. v. L.C.,231 Stead v. 
Stead,232 S.B. v. S.H.J.G.,233 N.A.B. v. H.L.B.,234 C.G. v. P.D.,235 G.W.Z. 
v. S.M.Z.,236 N.H. v. K.H.,237 Allen v. Wu,238 Pigott v. Nochasak,239  and 
Nova Scotia (Minister of Community Services) v. B.F.240 For instance, 
in R.N.G. v. K.Q.N.G., the Court stated the following:  
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That being said, while I am awarding sole custody of 
K.G. (born January 23, 1997) and D.G. (born September 
26, 1998) to R.N.G. I want to put into place as best that 
I can a system of visitation and access which will foster 
their cultural heritage. I also want to admonish R.N.G. 
that as was stated in Paragraph 40 of the decision that I 
just quoted that it is important that the custodial parent 
recognize the child's need of cultural identity and foster 
its development accordingly.241 
 
This statement demonstrates how the Court understood access time as 
a means for a racialized or minority parent to impart cultural 
knowledge and experiences to their children.  
 
When the racialized parent does receive custody, the non-
racialized parent also gets access, as was the case for the white fathers 
in the following cases: C.C. v. M.M.,242 Gordon v. Moustache,243 J.H.F. 
v. A.M.F.,244 Larocque v. Markie,245  Maier v. Chiao-Maier,246 Camba 
v. Sparks,247 Hannebohm v. Hannebohm,248 D.G.E.E. v. J.E.,249 
Imamura v. Remus,250 and Takenaka v. Kaleta.251 It was also the case 
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for the white mothers in the following cases: Dighe v. Dighe,252 Hayre 
v. Hayre,253 Flemmings v. Collet,254 I.G.C. v. K.A.C.,255 G.A.C. v. 
I.C.,256 and Gray v. Reynolds.257 The rationale that tends to be used in 
these cases for awarding access to the non-racialized parent is simply 
that access is valuable for the child and that the access parent has 
something to offer. For instance, in Larocque v. Markie, the Court 
stated that the white father “has always had a major role, financially 
and otherwise in supporting his daughter. Due to his major role, I 
would order there be regular and generous access.”258 
 
Drummond v. Lane259 provides an interesting counterexample 
to the above cases, where access was initially denied to a racialized 
father on the basis of racial issues. In this case, a Black father was 
seeking access to his mixed race child, but the mother’s white family 
refused to allow it. There were suggestions that the mother’s family 
was racist. The Court acknowledged that the father could contribute 
positively to the child’s life, but nevertheless did not award access, and 
instead implored the father in an interim order to reconsider whether 
his presence would really benefit the child when it would cause stress 
in the family. Stability and peace seemed to outweigh the racialized 
father’s presence. However, in a decision involving the same family, 
further to the previous interim order by the same judge, K.R.D. v. 
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L.A.L.,260 the Court ultimately responded negatively to the family’s 
racist attitude towards the Black father and awarded him access.  
 
Two (Different) Minority Races 
 
As we have seen, many custody cases that we have discussed above 
involve one minority parent and one white parent. Custody disputes 
involving parents from two minority backgrounds seem to represent far 
fewer cases, or at least do not evoke judicial comment about race. 
When discussion occurs, race and culture do not seem to be very 
significant deciding factors. 
 
For instance, in A.H. v. T.R.,261 which involved an Israeli 
Jewish mother and a Catholic Egyptian father, as in other cases, 
“culture” (which in this case encompassed factors such as religion and 
language) was considered along with other factors. The majority of 
factors considered (including the fact that some anti-Semitic 
sentiments were attributed to the father) made the mother the more 
suitable parent for custody, while the father received access. The 
parents were encouraged to help the child become knowledgeable 
about both aspects of his background (and were also encouraged to 
expose the child to a secular context to “defuse the tension”262). In 
Pheasant v. Idowu,263 both parties were also from minority 
backgrounds: the father was Nigerian and the maternal great-aunt 
seeking custody was Ojibwa. Like many other cases, race and culture 
did not figure prominently in the judgment—the child had bonded with 
the maternal great-aunt, and the father was unable to explain why he 
had not exercised access. The great-aunt maintained custody, and the 
father was given access in order to impart his heritage and culture. In 
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V.K. v. T.S.,264 race and culture, though mentioned, were not addressed 
as factors in the best interests analysis, presumably because neither 
party brought them up as issues. Similarly, though in the context of 
culture rather than race, in Re G.B.M.,265 custody of three part-Jewish 
Polish and part-Mennonite children was in dispute. This child 
protection case involved the Director of Child and Family Services and 
the children’s extended family members rather than a dispute between 
two parents.266 The Director obtained a permanent custody order. The 
Court, citing Van de Perre’s emphasis on the overall best interests of 
the child, with culture and race being but one factor to be dealt with 
pragmatically, stated that “[t]he children have equal contributors to 
their DNA, as well as equal heritage or cultural contributors. It would 
be a gross oversimplification to say that they are half this, or half that—
it is one of the responsibilities or obligations that guardians are 
entrusted with, and this Court is relieved at not having to make a ruling 
on race or culture.”267 This comment acknowledges the children’s dual 
religious and cultural heritage, but consciously resists analyzing it in 
depth, relegating culture and religion to a minimal role.  
 
Does the White Race Merit Equal Consideration? 
 
In a few cases, judges expressed a concern that part-white mixed race 
children need exposure to the white part of their backgrounds, as 
alluded to by the trial judge in Van de Perre.268 For instance, Dighe v. 
Dighe269 expressed concern that a part-East Indian, part-white child 
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would not have exposure to “Western culture” if raised by her East 
Indian father in an East Indian household. The judge was reassured by 
the fact that the father wished to raise the child in “the Western 
culture.” The judge did not go into detail regarding what “the Western 
culture” consists of, apart from mentioning that English would be the 
child’s primary language and that she would attend Bible study classes. 
The white mother received generous access but was denied custody 
primarily due to a period in which she had neglected her child. 
Similarly, though not dealing with a racialized child, in Von Bezold v. 
Brideau,270 the judge gave custody of a child with German heritage on 
one side to the child’s uncle, whose family maintained involvement 
with German culture and language “without prejudice” to mainstream 
Anglo-Canadian culture. This decision showed a concern for fostering 
“dual heritage” (though the judgment also placed emphasis on the 
uncle’s family’s stability and ability to provide for the child). Hoskins 
v. Boyd271 also made a point of saying that an Aboriginal child was part 
white before ordering that the child be returned to his white father. 
Finally, J.Y. v. A.C.272 ordered joint custody on the basis that it was in 
the part-white, part-Chinese child’s best interests to have equal access 
to the cultures of both parents. Szakacs v. Clarke273 also mentioned the 
added “bonus” of the child having access to both cultural heritages 
(Canadian and Jamaican) in a joint custody scenario. This apparent 
concern in some of the case law for supporting mixed race children’s 
access to both minority and white backgrounds echoes the melting pot 
theory of racial integration discussed above.274 Rather than maintaining 
a distinct minority identity as people who present as racialized or non-
white, mixed race children in these cases were encouraged to see 
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themselves as having more than one racial or cultural facet that mix 




This article has reviewed the complex issues that are raised when 
parental disputes arise over the custody and access of mixed race 
children. We have been informed by the notion that race is socially 
constructed in Western societies and remains an important factor to 
consider, given that racialization can be related to how a child is treated 
and her experience in life. That is, although race may be rooted in 
biological markers such as skin colour, its social meaning is of concern 
in the legal realm, in particular the ways in which race can generate 
racist assumptions and behaviour, including towards children. In 
addition, we have noted that race intersects with other factors such as 
gender and class, which can also influence assumptions and decision 
making. As such, we tried to take a non-essentialist approach to race 
and to consider its complex role in judicial decision making.  
 
We agree with Carasco that in a world where race still matters 
and racism persists, race is inevitably relevant to the development of 
children’s senses of self, their well-being, and to their futures in 
society, based on how others perceive them.275 That said, a child’s best 
interests must take account of the individual facts in a given case and 
the intersection of multiple factors such as race and gender. As several 
of our cases illustrate, a parent who is racialized may be a less than 
suitable custodial parent due to factors that are unrelated to race, such 
as abuse and failure to manage anger. We tend to agree with the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Van de Perre v. Edwards that racial 
identity cannot trump in these circumstances, although it can, and we 
would say should, still be taken into account. For instance, in Rushton 
v. Paris, Judge Sparks awarded custody to the white mother, but she 
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addressed race and racism in her decision and noted that a white mother 
might need assistance in parenting a biracial child.276 
 
The heart of our paper was a study of Canadian custody cases 
involving mixed race children, both prior to and following the Supreme 
Court decision in Van de Perre v. Edwards. Our case law study shows 
that the Supreme Court decision is routinely cited in the cases, but 
mainly for the point of appellate courts giving deference to trial judges. 
There was no significant finding of different outcomes before and after 
Van de Perre, and so we found little difference in judicial decision 
making in relation to custody disputes over mixed race children. 
Perhaps this finding is not surprising given the hesitant approach that 
the Supreme Court took to race as a factor, and its rejection of the 
argument that race should be given explicit consideration and 
considerable weight in custody cases.277 Prior to Van de Perre, race 
was discussed primarily when a party brought it up. Since Van de 
Perre, race seems to still only be discussed in any detail when a party 
raises it. As we saw in the section “Legislative Analysis,” Canadian 
custody statutes do not direct consideration of race or Aboriginal 
heritage, although judges have general discretion to consider these 
factors if relevant. Moreover, the Court did not give any guidance on 
how to weigh race against other factors, apart from saying that race is 
“but one factor.”278 At a formal level, then, the Supreme Court of 
Canada decision in Van de Perre prevents judges from engaging in 
either simplistic race-matching while ignoring other factors, or in 
colour-blindness when someone wants to raise the issue of race. That 
said, it is not clear that these problems arose often prior to Van de 
Perre. 
 
The most significant pattern in our case law study, as discussed 
in the section “Weighing Race and Culture against Other Factors,” was 
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that race is rarely found to be the key factor and the racialized parent 
is not favoured in custody cases involving mixed race children. Indeed 
sometimes race is not even discussed in such cases. When it is 
considered, race is treated as one among many factors, echoing Van de 
Perre. When a racialized parent is awarded custody, there are typically 
several other factors in that parent’s favour. When a non-racialized 
parent is awarded custody, race is only one of several factors and the 
other factors favour the non-racialized parent or there is evidence about 
the racialized parent that raises concerns about their parenting. If 
factors are more equal between the two parents, then joint custody may 
be awarded as a form of “compromise.” 
 
Another trend in some of the case law is to suggest that race or 
culture should only make a difference when all else is equal. This 
approach can be unhelpful in that it shifts the focus away from race and 
culture and onto other factors, thus understating the relevance of race 
in a child’s life. The court will spend its time scrutinizing whether all 
else is equal before it looks at race, and, in the process of scrutinizing, 
it will likely be demonstrated that all else is not equal and that one 
parent seems more fit than the other.279 In these scenarios, race never 
seems sufficient to sway a decision one way or the other, and 
consequently looks like a factor of lesser significance.   
 
We are not suggesting that a racialized parent is inevitably the 
parent who is best suited for primary care or custody of a racialized 
child. Instead, we suggest that it is key for any parent seeking custody 
to be able to demonstrate their ability to foster the healthy development 
of a child’s multifaceted identity. This multifaceted identity may 
sometimes include multiple racial and cultural backgrounds. As we 
mentioned earlier, some of the case law seems to be going in this 
direction; when courts do look at race, they frame the issue in terms of 
which parent will be better able to deal with issues of race that may 
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come up, and this may or may not be the racialized parent. This idea 
draws on the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Van de Perre, 
which talked about which parent would “best be able to contribute to 
the child’s healthy racial socialization and overall healthy 
development.”280 This kind of language was used in pre-Van de Perre 
cases, but all of the cases that used this framing of the issue and 
awarded custody to a white parent in part due to their ability to foster 
a healthy racial development were post-Van de Perre.281 As Judge 
Sparks suggested in Rushton v. Paris, parental education about how to 
raise a racialized child will be useful in many such cases.  
 
In some ways, the cases involving mixed race children are 
more similar to than they are different from other custody and access 
decisions. Certainly it was clear in several cases in which the racialized 
parent lost custody that she or he manifested serious inadequacies in 
relation to parenting. Another common trend across decisions in cases 
involving race and those that do not is to use access as a mechanism 
through which to keep a non-custodial parent’s relationship with a 
child vibrant. In mixed race cases, access can be a way to ensure that a 
racialized parent can play a role in the healthy development of a mixed 
race child even if she or he does not have custody. The extent to which 
access is used as a mechanism to deal with the racialized parent’s 
claims was, however, striking and might merit scrutiny in the future in 
order to determine whether a racialized parent’s merits as a potential 
custodial parent are being underplayed. Overall, then, another Supreme 
Court of Canada decision giving more guidance on how to weigh race 
against other factors relevant to a child’s best interests would be useful. 
 
Legislatures might also consider introducing more directive 
language into sections outlining factors related to the best interests of 
the child. In the child-placement cases that came up in our study in our 
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case law analysis, when the relevant legislation being discussed 
referred specifically to culture as a factor in the best interests test, 
culture typically was discussed—at the least to say that culture is not a 
relevant factor in the case at hand.282 This indicates that even though 
most of the cases we reviewed that considered cultural factors were 
decided under legislation that did not specifically refer to culture, when 
the legislation does specifically mention a factor, it can ensure that at 
least some judicial attention is paid to it. Given the discomfort that 
some judges may feel in relation to discussing race and culture and the 
silence that can result, it could be beneficial to be given further 
direction as to what is appropriate in a child-custody determination. As 
Amber Chew says, “it is not enough to rely on unspoken logic and 
subliminal prompting in the legislation to effect substantive 
equality.”283 Like Bunting and Law,284 we are not certain that the 
adoption/child protection and custody contexts are so different that the 
former requires specific legislative mention of culture while the latter 
does not. Exposure to race and culture, and education about these 
things, is important in both contexts. Legislation could list race (or 
“visible minority” status to use the more common Canadian language), 
indigeneity, and culture as specific factors that should be taken into 
account when considering a child’s best interests. If these factors are 
not relevant in a given case, a court can simply state as such and explain 
why. 
 
We also wanted to raise the question of evidence in cases 
involving mixed race children, given that the cases discussed in the 
section “Dismissing Race as a Factor” suggested that failure to submit 
evidence about race or racism might be fatal to race being given weight 
in a determination. In the Van de Perre case, the Supreme Court of 
Canada stated that if race is to be an issue in custody determinations, 
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evidence should be brought forward as to its significance. Bastarache 
J. stated that “I would also add that evidence of race relations in the 
relevant communities may be important to define the context in which 
the child and his parents will function. It is not always possible to 
address these sensitive issues by judicial notice, even though some 
notice of racial facts can be taken.”285 
 
Possibly in a subtle critique of a simplistic “race-matching” 
approach, Bastarache J. observed in relation to the Van de Perre case 
specifically that “there was absolutely no evidence adduced which 
indicates that race was an important consideration” and added: 
 
As noted by the appellant in her factum, there was 
essentially no evidence of racial identity by reason of 
skin colour or of race relations in Vancouver or North 
Carolina; there was no evidence of the racial awareness 
of the applicants or of their attitudes concerning the 
needs of the child with regard to racial and cultural 
identity. The issues of race and ethnicity were not 
argued at trial, nor were written submissions provided 
in the appeal. The sole evidence relied upon by the 
respondents in this Court was a blanket statement by 
Mrs. Edwards that the appellant could not teach Elijah 
what it was to be Black and the testimony of Dr. 
Korpach that Elijah would likely be considered to be of 
Black colour.286  
 
From this perspective, we can understand Bastarache J.’s concern that 
evidence be adduced as to the impact of race in the particular case. That 
said, some authors have suggested that it should not be necessary to 
bring forward evidence of the significance of race or racism in cases 
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involving mixed race children.287 Instead, judicial notice might be 
taken of the importance of race in children’s lives, especially those who 
are mixed race, and the continued prevalence of racism in Canadian 
society. Evidence as to the ability of particular parents to deal with 
potential racism or difficult social interactions and their child’s racial 
identity is likely key in some cases, but requiring parents to bring 
forward evidence of racism existing where they live in order for race 
to be considered relevant can be an onerous burden and should only be 
required when necessary. 
 
Finally, as many others have argued, considerable work needs 
to be done to improve the diversity of the Canadian judiciary. As well, 
more judicial education about the role of factors such as race, gender, 
and class is needed, as well as the ways in which these factors can 
intersect in some cases, including those related to the care of children. 
In emphasizing the significance of race to children and to parenting, 
we do not wish to suggest that the gendered nature of caregiving in 
Canadian society should be overlooked. Nor do we suggest that joint 
custody or shared parenting norms should be used as an easy 
compromise to involve both parents in the life of a mixed race child, 
especially if other factors contraindicate its use. Rather, judges and 
others involved in child-custody determinations should be encouraged 
to consider carefully the facts in any given family’s history and to 
weigh carefully the complex factors that may often shape parenting 
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